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Abstract
Most real world situations which are susceptible to herding are also characterized by direct payoﬀ
externalities. Yet, the bulk of the theoretical and experimental literature focuses on pure informa-
tional externalities. In this paper we study several diﬀerent forms of payoﬀ externalities that interact
with a standard herding model. More than 6000 subjects, including a subsample of 267 consultants
from an international consulting ￿rm, participated in an internet experiment. We also replicate and
review earlier cascade experiments. Finally, we study reputation eﬀects in the context of herding.
JEL￿classi￿cation: C92, D8.
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Herding behavior seems to be ubiquitous in human decision processes and it can actually be justi￿ed as
a rational response to uncertainty and informational asymmetries in the environment. Several sources
of rational herding have been described in the theoretical literature. Information cascade1 models
pioneered by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992), Welch (1992), and Banerjee (1992) show
that herding may occur even when individuals￿ payoﬀs do not in any way depend on the behavior of
others. Externalities are created only through the information that can be deduced from the observed
actions. Other models are additionally based on payoﬀ externalities that are widespread in practice.
For example, herding of analysts or fund managers in models of reputational herding (e.g., Scharfstein
and Stein, 1990), or herd behavior of depositors in bank runs (e.g., Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) may
be explained by such models.
The purpose of the current paper is threefold. First, the paper presents a broad￿scaled replication
of existing laboratory studies on information cascade models. Second, the paper aims to extend this
literature by experimentally studying various settings in which payoﬀ externalities are present. And
third, the paper investigates the importance of reputation for cascade behavior. In other words, this is
a study of the in￿u e n c eo fr o l em o d e l so nh e r db e h a v i o r .
With respect to replication, our experiment diﬀers from earlier cascade experiments in that (1)
we replicate those experiments with more than 6000 subjects, many more than usual. (2) The large
number of subjects allows us to test a number of variations, which may potentially be important (e.g.,
longer sequences of decisions). (3) Instead of the usual undergraduate student population, we use a
diverse subject pool, including 267 consultants from an international consulting ￿rm. More than 40%
of our subjects hold a Ph.D. or are currently enrolled in a Ph.D. program. A majority of subjects
have a background in the natural sciences. (4) Finally, we deviate from the usual laboratory setting by
utilizing the internet for our experiment.2
1An information cascade is said to occur when it becomes rational to ignore one￿s own private information and instead
follow the predecessors￿ decisions. Since no further information is revealed once an information cascade has started,
ineﬃciencies occur even though each individual is behaving rationally.
2Arguably, for many people who buy and sell goods on the internet, use internet banking and brokerage services etc.,
the internet is probably by now a very natural setting for decision making. Nevertheless, conducting experiments on the
internet is still novel. For experiments that have been conducted over the internet, see e.g., Forsythe et al. (1992, 1999)
, Lucking-Reiley (1999), Anderhub et al. (2001), Charness et al. (2001), Shavit et al. (2001), Bosch￿DomŁnech et al.
(2002), and G￿th et al. (2002). For technical issues, see e.g., Greiner et al. (2002). The internet is also used to provide a
platform to run economic experiments for interactive learning (Holt, 2002).
1The second purpose of our paper is to study payoﬀ externalities. The bulk of previous experimental
studies has focused on settings without payoﬀ externalities. However, many, if not most, real world
examples of herding have a payoﬀ externality component. We will consider positive payoﬀ externalities,
which should reinforce herding, as well as negative externalities, which should slow down herding. Since
we assume sequential decision making, one can further diﬀerentiate between externalities that apply
only to predecessors, only to followers, or to both, but possibly in diﬀerent ways.
There are many real world examples for these kinds of payoﬀ externalities. For example, the choice of
software or computers is often described as a situation with positive externalities. The more users adopt
the same system as oneself, the easier becomes the interaction with them. For the network externalities
to materialize it does not matter (much) whether other users have already adopted the system or
whether they will do so soon. Timing may be important, however, in other situations. Consider the
choice of a research area. If one aims at maximizing the number of citations, one should enter a new
research area as citations can obviously only be directed at older papers. A new research area may turn
out to be a dead end, though.
Negative externalities may be caused by overcrowding (e.g., in restaurants, supermarket check￿out
counters, parking lots etc. where one￿s utility decreases with the number of predecessors who chose
the same restaurant, cashier, or parking lot but where one is not bothered by people who arrive later).
Finally, there are situations where one is punished for taking the same action as a predecessor but is
rewarded for successors. Avantgardists and fashion leaders fall into this category as well as the unlucky
participants in snowball systems or chain letters.
Finally, the third purpose of our paper is to study the role of reputation for herding or cascade
behavior. We do this by telling subjects the cumulative payoﬀs their predecessors have achieved in
earlier unrelated rounds. The hypothesis is that subjects are in￿uenced primarily by the subject with
the highest earlier payoﬀ despite the fact that this information is irrelevant in a rational Bayesian model.
In Section 2 we describe the basic experimental settings. Despite the large literature on network
economics (see e.g. Shy, 2001, for a textbook treatment), there is a very small literature on the interplay
between information cascades and network eﬀects. Two exceptions are Choi (1997) and Frisell (2003)
who, however, both deal with versions of herding models that diﬀer in some important aspects from
the Bikhchandani et al. (1992) model. A combination of the Bikhchandani et al. model with payoﬀ
2externalities does not seem to be have been treated theoretically.3 Therefore, in Section 3 we derive
the theoretical predictions for the various treatments. In this context it is interesting that we ￿nd a
multitude of equilibria in the treatment with network eﬀects whereas there do not seem to exist pure
strategy equilibria in treatments where only the followers cause positive payoﬀ externalities.
In Section 4 we describe the experimental procedures in detail. Since internet experiments are still
relatively new, we explain how we resolved the issues of recruitment, payment of subjects, and the
implementation on the internet. Section 5 contains the results. The ￿r s tp a r ti nt h i ss e c t i o nd e a l sw i t h
replication of earlier cascade experiments. Besides presenting our own results, we review and compare
results from 10 experiments that are scattered in the literature. The second part presents the results
from the treatments with payoﬀ externalities. And ￿nally, the third part deals with reputation eﬀects
in the basic BHW model. Section 6 concludes. Instructions of the experiment are contained in an
Appendix.
2T h e e x p e r i m e n t
Subjects had to choose sequentially between two ￿investment opportunities￿ A and B.O n l y o n e o f
the two could be successful and, if so, would pay 10 ￿Lotto￿Euros￿. The unsuccessful alternative paid
nothing. Subjects were told the a priori probability that investment A was successful, P(A)=0 .55
(and consequently, P(B)=0 .45). Furthermore, they were told that they would receive a tip by an
investment banker which was reliable with probability P(a|A)=P(b|B)=0 .6. Sessions with these
probabilities are denoted by 55-60. In some treatments we conducted additional sessions with the
probability combination 50-66.4
Subjects were informed that all prior subjects in their group had received a tip by other investment
bankers and that these tips were independent of theirs (see the Appendix for a translation of the
instructions). Subjects were able to observe the decisions of their predecessors but, in general, not their
signals.
We consider two principal versions of this model:5 one in which the payoﬀ depends exclusively on
3There is one experimental paper with payoﬀ externalities in a Bikhchandani et al. (1992) framework we are aware of.
Hung and Plott (2001) study treatments in which subjects are rewarded if a majority of decisions was correct or if their
respective action agreed with the majority, respectively. The externalities in our experiment are, however, of a diﬀerent
form.
4The probability combination 50-66 was most often used in the literature (see e.g., Anderson and Holt, 1997). However,
it has the disadvantage of requiring a tie￿braking assumption in many cases.
5In a companion paper we focus on treatments with market prices for the investment opportunities A and B (as in
3one￿s own decision. This version is equivalent to the basic model studied by Bikhchandani et al. (1992)
and is denoted by BHW. For comparison, we also include a treatment BHW+AS in which additional
to predecessors￿ actions also all their signals were observable. There is also a ￿reputation￿ treatment
BHW+R, which we will be described in more detail in Section 5.3.
In the second version of the above model we introduce four diﬀerent forms of payoﬀ externalities, i.e.,
we consider treatments in which payoﬀs also depend directly (positively or negatively) on the decisions
of others. Table 1 lists the main features of all treatments.
Table 1: Treatments
treatment description # of groups
BHW Bikhchandani/Hishleifer/Welch 63/12/15∗
BHW+AS BHW + all signals observable 70/12/9∗
BHW+R BHW + cumulative payoﬀso f 2 9
predecessors observable (reputation)
Network BHW + receive x f o re a c hg r o u p 12/6∗∗
member who chooses same alternative
Follower BHW + receive x f o re a c hf o l l o w e r 2 6
who chooses same alternative
Early bird BHW +p a yx f o re a c hp r e d e c e s s o r 2 6
who chose same alternative
Hipster BHW + pay (receive) x for each 12/6∗∗
predecessor (follower) who chose same alternative
Note: ∗ x/y/z denotes x groups with probability combination 55-60, y groups with 50-66, and z groups with
consultants (also 55-60). In treatments BHW+R, Follower and Early bird the probability combination
is 55-60; in treatments Network and Hipster x is either 0.4 or 1; in treatments Follower and Early bird
x is always 0.4. ∗∗ denotes that there were 12 groups with x =0 .4 and 6 with x =1 .
In treatment Network subjects receive an amount x f o re a c ho t h e rs u bj e c ti nt h e i rg r o u pt h a tc h o o s e s
the same action. This payoﬀ structure is supposed to model network externalities. Examples are the
choice of software or mobile phone operators where it is not only important to choose the best product
but also to choose the product that is chosen by the majority of other consumers because the utility
from such a product is increasing in the number of adopters.
In treatment Followers subjects receive an amount x only for those subjects that decide later in
their group and choose the same action. Examples for such one￿sided network externalities are choices
on software that is only upwards compatible or the choice of a research topic by a scientist who is
Avery and Zemsky, 1998). Those treatments were conducted in the same experiment (see Drehmann, Oechssler, and
Roider, 2004).
4concerned about the number of citations to his work. Clearly there can be no citations from papers
that have already been published.
In treatment Early birds subjects have to pay x for each predecessors who chose the same action
as they. This kind of payoﬀ externality is typical for situations where overcrowding is an issue as with
restaurants, movie theaters, beaches etc. But also bank runs fall into this category.
Finally, treatment Hipster is a combination of Follower and Early bird as subjects receive x for
each follower who chooses the same action but have to pay x f o re a c hp r e d e c e s s o rw i t ht h es a m ea c t i o n .
Examples include fashion leaders, avantgardists, and the participants in snowball systems or chain
letters.
3 Theoretical predictions
Despite the simplicity of our experimental setting, theoretical predictions are surprisingly diﬃcult to
make in some of our treatments. Table 2 presents a non￿exhaustive list of candidates for pure strategy
(perfect Bayesian) equilibria given probability combination 55-60.
Table 2: Candidate equilibria
candidate ￿rst player￿s strategy strategies of players 2 through 20
BHW follow own signal A if ∆ ≥ 1; B if ∆ ≤− 2; otherwise follow own signal
uniform f o l l o wo w ns i g n a l f o l l o wa c t i o no fp l a y e r1
reverse follow own signal choose opposite of player 1
stubborn choose A choose A
Note: ∆ denotes the net number of a signals (#a signals − #b signals) that can be imputed from the
actions of predecessors; in treatment BHW+AS, ∆ denotes the net number of directly observed
a signals.
In treatments BHW and BHW+AS there is a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium (see Bikhchandani
et al. 1992, or Drehmann, Oechssler, and Roider, 2004), which depends in a simple way on the net
number of signals ∆ that can be imputed from the actions of predecessors and the own signal. We call
this the BHW equilibrium. It can easily be checked that this equilibrium does not exist for any of the
treatments with payoﬀ externalities.
Since in treatment Early bird payoﬀs depend only on the actions of predecessors and the own
action, the game can be solved by backward induction. It turns out that cascades happen but they are
5endogenously broken once suﬃciently many predecessors chose the same action. From this point on,
actions may reveal signals again, which may, in turn lead to a new cascade. In comparison to the BHW
treatment, where cascades once started last until the end of the group, we should see shorter cascades
in treatment Early bird.
Treatment Network allows for a multiplicity of equilibria. All of the candidates uniform, reverse,
and stubborn can be supported as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with suitably chosen oﬀ￿equilibrium
beliefs. More complex equilibria, in which players 2 through 20 act diﬀerently, also exist. Finally, in
treatments Follower and Hipster none of the candidates listed in Table 2 are a Nash equilibrium and we
conjecture that no pure strategy equilibrium exists. As an example consider the uniform equilibrium
candidate in treatment Follower.I ft h e￿rst players receives and follows a b signal, all subsequent players
are supposed to play B. However, the last player, who does not have any followers, wants to deviate if
he receives an a signal because his a signal and the ￿rst player￿s b signal cancel and we are back to the
a priori probability, which with 0.55 is in favor of A.
However, note that if one assumes that players are myopic, i.e., that they ignore all future actions,
treatment Follower yields the same prediction as BHW. Likewise, Early bird and Hipster become
indistinguishable from each other. Below we shall also test this prediction.
4 Experimental design
More than 6000 subjects participated in our online experiment which was available for a period of
about six weeks in the spring of 2002 on our web site http://www.a-oder-b.de w h i c hi sG e r m a nf o r
a-or-b. Subjects decided in sequence and were able to observe the actual decisions of prior participants
in their respective groups. In general, the group size was 20.6 Subjects were asked to make decisions in
three independent groups, thus in total there were more than 18000 decisions. We call the ￿rst decision
stage 1, the second stage 2, etc.
Payoﬀs in ￿Lotto￿Euros￿ were calculated as follows. If a subject chose the correct investment,
he received 10 Lotto￿Euros. This was the ￿nal payoﬀ for this task in the BHW treatments. In the
treatments with payoﬀ externalities, once all subjects in the respective group had decided, the payoﬀso f
the subjects were raised or lowered by the amount of the respective payoﬀ externalities. In treatments
6Except in two cases: in the general subject pool, the group length in treatment BHW+AS was 10; with the consultants,
t h ea v e r a g eg r o u pl e n g t hi nt r e a t m e n tBHW (BHW+AS) was 7 (8).
6with negative externalities (Early bird and Hipster) subjects additionally received an endowment of 5
(if x =0 .4)o r10( i fx =1 ) for each task to avoid losses since negative payments are obviously very
diﬃcult to enforce in any experiment, let alone an internet experiment.
4.1 Recruiting and payment
T h ee x p e r i m e n tw a sa n n o u n c e di ns e v e r a la d si nt h es c i e n c es e c t i o no ft h el a r g e s tG e r m a nw e a k l y
newspaper Die Zeit, two popular science magazines, and two national student magazines. Posters were
distributed at most sciences faculties at German universities. Finally, emails were sent to Ph.D. students
and postdocs in science and economics departments at 35 universities in Germany. The web site www.a-
oder-b.de was linked to the Laboratory for Experimental Research in Economics at the University of
Bonn and to the sponsor McKinsey & Company to demonstrate that the experiment had a proper
scienti￿c background and that the promised ￿nancial rewards were credible.
All payoﬀs in the experiment were denoted in ￿Lotto￿Euro￿. Each Lotto￿Euro was a ticket in a
lottery to win one of our main prizes. In total there were 11 prizes of 1000 Euro each. The odds in those
lotteries were ￿xed in advance and known to subjects. Each subject, when logging in on our website
was told explicitly the odds per lottery ticket for winning one of our main prizes. Thus, maximizing the
probability of winning one of the prizes was equivalent to maximizing the number of lottery tickets. All
winners were noti￿ed by mail, and their prize money was paid through bank transfers.
In Phase I of the experiment, 1409 subjects played with high powered incentives where each of 40000
lottery tickets had an equal chance of winning one of 5 prizes of 1000 Euros. Since subjects played on
average for about 15 minutes, they were making an expected hourly ￿wage￿ of 14.19E u r o s ,w h i c hi s
comparable to a very good student job and to pay in laboratory experiments. In Phase II, each of 90000
lottery tickets had an equal chance of winning one of another 5 prizes of 1000 Euros. Finally, in Phase
III, 1162 subjects competed for the remaining 1000 Euros. Only in this Phase III of the experiment,
where almost no monetary incentives were provided, subjects did not know how many lottery tickets
were issued in the respective phase. This payment scheme was due to the fact that an unexpected large
number of subjects participated in our experiment. But it also gives us the chance to test the role of
incentives in such a setting.
Additionally, there was a control group of 267 consultants from McKinsey & Company, an inter-
national consulting ￿rm, who participated in the experiment on the same web site a couple of weeks
7before the start of the actual experiment. The subjects of the control experiment were recruited by an
internal email to all German McKinsey consultants. Subjects knew that all other subjects were also
consultants. About a third of those addressed participated. These subjects had the chance to win 8
vouchers for a nice dinner for two in a restaurant each worth 150 Euros.
4.2 Subject pool
In total, 6099 subjects ￿nished our experiment of which 5832 subjects participated in the main experi-
ment and 267 in the control experiment with consultants.7 Table 3 lists some of the main characteristics




































Figure 1: Composition of the subject pool. (Note: ￿Sciences￿ includes physics, chemistry, mathematics, and
computer science; ￿Economics￿ includes economics, business administration and related subjects; ￿Medicine￿
includes medicine, psychology, and dentistry; ￿Liberal Arts￿ includes all languages, history, and pedagogy. ￿Misc.￿
stands for miscellaneous ￿elds.)
In contrast to most experiments in economics, our subjects come from a broad range of ￿elds. Figure
1 shows the frequencies of the main subject groups. Each bar in Figure 1 shows the number of subjects
7788 individuals logged on but did not ￿nish the experiment. Their decisions were not included in the history Ht since
they did not face monetary incentives (payment was conditional on ￿nishing all three stages of the experiment).
8Table 3: Properties of the subject pool
Average age 28.3
% of female subjects 27.8
% completed (at least) ￿rst university degree 56.9
% current students 36.4
% non￿students 6.7
%c o m p l e t e dP h . D . 13.7
% current Ph.D. students 31.3
w h os t u d yf o ro rh a v e￿nished a ￿rst degree, the number of subjects who currently are Ph.D. students,
and the number of subjects who have ￿nished a Ph.D.8 Considering the number of Ph.D. students and
Ph.D.￿s we believe we succeeded in recruiting a fairly bright subject pool.
4.3 Implementation
When arriving on our web site, subjects read a screen that introduced the general problem and the
rules of the game. Subsequently, subjects were asked for some personal information, like name, mailing
address, email, ￿e l do fs t u d y ,a g ee t c . , a n ds u bj e c t sw e r eo n l ya l l o w e dt op l a yi fa l li n f o r m a t i o nr e q u e s t e d
was actually provided. This was also a measure to prevent subjects from playing twice: in order to
win in the lottery, one had to give a correct mailing address, and the program ensured that the same
name-postal code combination as well as the same email address could only play once. We also used
cookies to prevent using the same computer twice.9
After entering the personal information, subjects were randomly placed in a currently active group,10
and had to make their ￿rst decision. Afterwards they were randomly placed in another active group for
the second task and then in a third group for the ￿nal task. No feedback about results was given until the
subject had completed all three tasks, and even then they were only told how many ￿Lotto￿Euro￿ they
had won. Usually the tasks for each subject came from diﬀerent treatments. Finally, we asked subjects
for voluntary feedback as to how they formed their decision, and 687 subjects sent response emails.
The last column of Table 1 lists the number of groups that participated in our experiment, separately
8Given that each time that we sent out emails to Ph.D. students and post-docs to advertise the experiment, there was
immediately a peak in access to our webpage, one can be con￿dent in these numbers.
9It will never be possible to completely prevent clever people from playing more than once. However, we are con￿dent
that not many such attempts were successful, and given the size of the subject pool, those few probably do not matter
much.
10Ag r o u pw a sactive when it was neither full nor closed (i.e., when another subject was active in this group). We also
ensured that subjects who logged on at about the same time were allocated to diﬀerent treatments to prevent ￿observational
learning￿ in case two subjects sat next to each other in a computer pool.
9for each combination of treatments, probabilities, and whether subjects came from the general subject
pool or the control experiment with the consultants.
5R e s u l t s
5.1 Replication
To make our results comparable to earlier experimental studies we shall concentrate on the following
three measures. (1) Average rationality under common knowledge of rationality (ruck), which is de-
￿ned as the fraction of subjects who behaved according to a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium under the
assumption that all predecessors are commonly known to be Bayesians.11 (2) The fraction of cases in
which subjects rationally decided against their own signal if they are in a cascade is denoted by casc.
Arguably, casc is a harder test for cascade theories since ruck includes all the cases in which subjects
(rationally) follow their own signal. (3) The fraction of cases in which subjects followed their own signal
is denoted by own. For comparison, we also report the equilibrium value of own,d e n o t e db yown∗,t h a t
would have obtained had all subject behaved according to ruck (as de￿ned above).
Table 4: BHW treatments
subject pool treatment prob. all subjects subjects on pot. eq. path
comb. ruck casc own own∗ ruck casc own own∗
general BHW 55-60 .66 .34 .75 .59 .86 .74 .74 .90
BHW+AS 55-60 .72 .41 .74 .68 - - - -
consultants BHW 55-60 .68 .16 .85 .66 .90 1.00 .83 .93
BHW+AS 55-60 .78 .52 .69 .60 - - - -
general BHW 50-66 .78 .45 .75 .62 .95 .78 .84 .77
BHW+AS 50-66 .76 .59 .69 .69 - - - -
Note: The average length of potential equilibrium paths is 6 in treatment BHW 50-66, and 3 in the two
remaining cases; as in treatment BHW+AS signals of predecessors were public information, we
do not diﬀerentiate in this case whether or not a subject observed a potential equilibrium history.
Table 4 lists those measure for our BHW and BHW+AS treatments, and for our subsample with
c o n s u l t a n t s( w h oa l s op l a y e dt r e a t m e n t sBHW and BHW+AS). First, note that the phase of the
experiment (recall that diﬀerent incentives were provided in diﬀerent phases) does not have a signi￿cant
in￿uence on those results according to MWU-tests. Neither does the stage of the task (whether a task
was ￿rst, second or third) matter. Table 4 lists the above de￿ned measures for all subjects and for
11For a decision which, given the history of imputed signals, obviously violates Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, we let
players assume that the deviator followed his private signal.
10Table 5: Previous BHW cascade experiments
study treatment prob. group size ruck casc
Alevy et al. (2003) symmetric, students 50-66 5 .95 .89
Anderson/Holt (1997) symm., no public sig. 50-66 6 .92 .73
Anderson (2001) 2$ 50-66 6 .70
Cipriani/Guarino (2004) ￿xed price 50-70 12. 8 3
Goeree et al. (2004) T =2 0 50-66 20 .64
Hung/Plott (2001) individualistic 50-66 10. 7 7
K￿bler/Weizs￿cker (2004) NC 50-66 6 .78
Oberhammer/Stiehler (2001) 50-66 6 .86 .73
Willinger/Ziegelmeyer (1998) treatment 1 50-60 6 .64
Ziegelmeyer et al. (2002) blue line, exp. 1&2 55-66 9 .69
Note: Only studies that implement the BHW model are included. In some cases, values for ruck or casc could
not be determined from the information given in the respective papers. Also, in some cases it was
unclear whether all observations were counted or only those on a potential equilibrium path. The
probability combination (prob.) is given as x-y, which denotes an a priori probability for A of x%
and a signal precision of y%.
those that are on a potential equilibrium path. We say that subjects are on a potential equilibrium path
as long as there is no prior decision that obviously violates behavior in a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
from the viewpoint of a player who cannot observe the private signals of predecessors.
First, a look at all subjects shows that from a theoretical perspective subjects rely too heavily on
their own private signal as own is weakly above own∗ in all cases. As a result, in our main treatment,
BHW, 55-66, subjects act in accordance with theory in only 66% of cases. Even more dramatic is
the picture with respect to casc. Only in 34% of cases did subjects decide against their signal but in
accordance with Bayesian updating. Those numbers are lower than those found previously in most of
the literature. In the following, we provide a brief overview over the earlier experiments on information
cascades and oﬀer some explanations for the observed behavioral diﬀerences.
Table 5 lists the results of all cascade experiments implementing the basic setup of BHW that we
could ￿nd in the literature.12 While the experiments diﬀer with respect to a number of design issues,
most notable the number of players in a sequence and the probability combinations, most values of ruck
and casc are roughly comparable and are substantially higher than those in our experiment.
What could account for those diﬀerences? One possible explanation may be that decisions are more
diﬃcult on average when 20 subjects decide in sequence rather than the usual 6.13 To test for this we
12We thank Lisa Anderson and Charlie Holt for kindly providing their data.
13Huck and Oechssler (2001) show that ruck values are substantially lower when decisions are more complex.
11look at the decisions of our ￿rst 6 subjects in each group. And indeed, for the ￿rst 6 subjects ruck is
82%, which is closer to the numbers found in the literature. Additional support for this hypothesis is
provided by the results of Goeree et al. (2004). They also consider sequences of 20 subjects and report
one of the lowest values for casc (see Table 5). Another aspect emerges when we consider subjects on
a potential equilibrium path (right panel of Table 4). On average, potential equilibrium paths have
length 6. On those paths, values of ruck and casc are very high (and comparable to those reported
in Table 5), which indicates that subjects become confused as soon as they observe deviations from a
potential equilibrium path. Interestingly, on potential equilibrium paths, subjects do rely less often on
their private information than predicted by theory under probability combination 55-60.
A second possible explanation is that subjects simply mistrust the behavior of their predecessors
on the internet so much that they rather rely on their own signals. However, this consideration should
not matter in treatment BHW+AS where all signals of predecessors were observable and the payoﬀ
maximizing decision is simply a matter of forming conditional expectations. Yet, the measures ruck,
own, and casc are not substantially better (even though for probability combination 55-60 both for the
general subject pool and the consultants ruck and casc are signi￿cantly higher in BHW+AS at the 1%
level according to MWU￿tests). Also, in the control experiment with consultants, where all participants
had a relatively good idea about the types of their predecessors, the reliance on the own signal is even
more pronounced,14 and the number for casc is substantially lower compared to the general subject
pool. It seems that consultants are more reluctant to rely on the decisions of others. Interestingly,
Alevy et al. (2004) also ￿nd in their experiment that professional traders have lower ruck and casc
values than college students.
A third possible explanation is that the probability combination 55-60 (with asymmetric prior) is
more diﬃcult than the (symmetric) combination 50-66, which was often used in the literature. For
example, a subjects with a b signal on the second position should already ignore his signal if the ￿rst
subject chose A for 55-60 but not for 50-66. This hypothesis is supported by the signi￿cantly higher
numbers for ruck (78%) and casc (45%) in 50-66.15
Finally, the level of payoﬀs can play a decisive role in complex decision problems. For example,
Anderson (2001) shows that errors decrease substantially when the payoﬀ for a correct decision is
14This cannot be explained by a higher own in equilibrium. For consultants, given the random draw of signals, equilibrium
own would have been 0.66 whereas for BHW 55-66 it would have been 0.59.
15With respect to ruck (casc)t h ed i ﬀerence is signi￿cant at the 1%( 10%) level.
12increased from 0 to 2$. In our experiment subjects earned about 1.25 Euros for a correct decision in
phase I and 0.55 Euros in phase II.16 While we do not observe a signi￿cant diﬀerence in ruck between
phase 1 and 2, it is possible that the lower payoﬀs in combination with the ￿rst and the third explanation
above are responsible for the values observed in Table 4.
It is also interesting to test whether diﬀerent subject characteristics in￿uence ruck and casc.H o w -
ever, we ￿nd no signi￿cant diﬀerence between male and female subjects or between subjects holding a
Ph.D., Ph.D. students, or others. In treatment BHW the McKinsey consultants diﬀer from the gen-
e r a ls u b j e c tp o o lb ys h o w i n gs i g n i ￿cantly higher values for own and lower values for casc (at the 1%
respectively 5% level according to MWU-tests).
5.2 Payoﬀ externalities
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Figure 2: Distribution of decision imbalances after the last period (pooled over x)
We call the diﬀerence between the number of A and B decisions the ￿decision imbalance￿. Figure
2 shows the distribution of decision imbalances after the last player. Treatment Network clearly stands
out as the only treatment in which extreme imbalances occur. On the other hand, treatments Early bird
16Half the groups in BHW 50-66 were played in phase I and half in phase II.
13and Hipster produce very balanced distributions centered around 0.17 Kolmogorov￿Smirnov tests reveal
that the distribution for Network is signi￿cantly diﬀerent from all other treatments except Follower (at
the 5% level or better). Recall that if subjects are myopic, there should not be any diﬀerence between
Early bird and Hipster, and between BHW and Follower. And indeed, there are no signi￿cant diﬀerences
in the distributions of decision imbalances for those two pairs. In all other pair-wise comparison one
cannot reject that the distributions are signi￿cantly diﬀerent (at the 5% level or better).
A second indicator is the number and length of runs in the data. A run is a sequence of consecutive
subjects who made the same decision. If there are positive payoﬀ externalities (as in Network)w ew o u l d
expect longer (and therefore fewer) runs. With negative externalities, runs should be shorter and more
frequent. Table 6 lists the average number and length of runs per group for our treatments (separate
for A and B runs).18 As expected, Network has the lowest number and highest average length of runs.
Again in accordance with myopia, BHW and Follower seem to show runs of similar (medium) length
and frequency. The shortest and most frequent runs are found for Early bird and Hipster. The fact that
B runs are shorter on average in all but one case might be explained by the higher a priori probability
for A.
Table 6: Number and length of runs
treatment x number of runs average length A runs average length B runs
Network 0.4 8.55 3.511 .39
Network 1 4.50 4.38 4.50
Follower 0.4 9.58 2.62 1.53
Early bird 0.4 10.38 2.14 1.70
Hipster 0.4 11.92 1.79 1.56
Hipster 11 2.33 1.68 1.57
BHW - 9.84 2.45 1.59
Note: Probability combination 55-60; general subject pool.
A third interesting aspect of the data is predictability. For example, is it possible to predict early
on which product will capture a larger slice of a market? Hence, we ask whether one can forecast the
majority decision in a group after observing the ￿rst n players. Table 7 shows correlations between the
sign of the decision imbalance after player n =2 ,5,10,15 and the sign of the decision imbalance after
player 20. Note that a decision imbalance is positive if a majority of subjects chose A, and vice versa.
17The decision imbalance is exactly 0 in 26.9% of cases in Early bird a n di n6 1.1% of cases in Hipster, whereas the same
holds only in 9.2% of cases for BHW, in 7.7% for Follower,a n di n0 %f o rNetwork.
18Treatment BHW+AS is excluded since all groups in this treatment consisted only of 10 subjects.
14Treatment Network with x =1shows the highest predictability. Already after the second player the
correlation is 0.86 and signi￿cant at the 5% level. Follower and Network with x =0 .4 also show high
correlations. In contrast, for Hipster correlations of early rounds with the ￿nal imbalance is sometimes
negative. Even very late in the game, the ￿nal outcome cannot be reliably predicted.
Table 7: Predictability of majority choice
correlation between the sign of the decision
imbalance after player 20 and after player...
treatment x 2 5 10 15
Network 0.4 0.28 0.52∗ 0.67∗∗ 1.0∗∗∗
Network 1 0.86∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗
Follower 0.4 0.21 0.71∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗
Early bird 0.4 0.20 0.32 0.71∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗
Hipster 0.4 −0.30 −0.71∗∗ 0.13 0.71∗∗
Hipster 1 −1.0∗ 0.32 −0.32 0.45
BHW - 0.08 0.23∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗
Note: Probability combination 55-60; general subject pool; ∗∗∗ signi￿cant at 1%-level; ∗∗ signi￿cant at
5%-level; ∗ signi￿cant at 10%-level.
Given the multiplicity of equilibria for treatment Network it is interesting which, if any, of those
equilibria can be observed in the data. We classify the decisions of a group of 20 subjects as in
accordance with an equilibrium if at most 2 (for x =1 )or at most 4 (for x =0 .4) subjects deviate
from the equilibrium path. In this sense, 5 of the 6 groups for x =1 , can be classi￿ed as one of the
equilibria listed in Table 2. In particular, there are 3 groups that can be classi￿ed as playing a uniform
equilibrium, 1 as uniform or stubborn,19 and 1 group even seems to be playing the slightly strange
reverse equilibrium. Of the 12 groups with x =0 .4, 6 groups can be classi￿ed as one of the listed
equilibria, namely, 2 as stubborn,a n d4a suniform or stubborn.
5.3 Reputation eﬀects
Treatment BHW+R was the same as BHW except that subjects were able to observe not only the
actions of their predecessors but also the cumulative payoﬀs from the two decisions those subjects
made in the ￿r s tt w o( u n r e l a t e d )s t a g e so ft h ee x p e r i m e n t . 20 In a rational Bayesian model, this extra
information is irrelevant. However, we suspected that subjects would rely more on the decision of
19If the ￿rst subjects receives an a signal, the two equilibria are indistinguishable.
20Recall that each subjects had to make three decisions (stage 1 through 3). BHW+R was always played on stage 3.
15predecessors with the highest payoﬀs (the ￿success models￿). That is, subjects with higher payoﬀsh a v e
a better reputation and are imitated more often.
Figure 3 shows that subjects are indeed in￿uenced by the decision of the predecessor with the highest
reputation (i.e., the highest cumulative payoﬀ in stages 1 and 2). Regardless of the own signal, an A













Figure 3: Fraction of subjects choosing A depending on the choice of the most successful predecessor
(and own signal). (Note: Including only subjects that had at least one predecessor and including only cases
when the predecessor with the highest reputation was unique (547 out of 551 cases).)
This result is supported by a logit regression where the probability of subject t choosing A is
explained by (1) subject t￿s signal, (2) a dummy variable dat−1 that is equal to one if the history ∆t−1
(expressed by the net number of imputed a signals) is such that the subject should choose A irrespective
of his signal and that is equal to zero otherwise, (3) a dummy variable dbt−1 that is equal to one if,
given ∆t−1, the subject should choose B irrespective of his signal and that is equal to zero otherwise,
(4) the decision of the predecessor with the highest payoﬀ, Rept−1, and (5) a constant. Table 8 shows
that, even though the private signal and the history should summarize all relevant information, the
coeﬃcient of Rept−1 is positive and signi￿cant at the 1% level, which demonstrates that subjects seem
to follow success models.
From an ex-post perspective, did it make sense to follow the respective success model? On average
16Table 8: Logit analysis: choice of A in treatment BHW+AS
signal dat−1 dbt−1 Rept−1
coeﬃcient 2.571∗∗ −.055 .069 .457∗∗
(standard deviation) (.221) (.233) (.344) (.125)
Note: 547 observations (only subjects with at least one predecessor and a unique highest-reputation
predecessor are included); -2 Log-Likelihood = 555.95; R2 (Nagelkerkes) = 0.383; ∗∗ signi￿cant
at 1%-level; regression includes a constant.
subjects chose the successful alternative in 56% of cases. However, success models did so in 62% of
cases, so that these subjects were indeed (somewhat) more successful in picking the right alternative.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In a large￿scale internet experiment we investigated information cascade models with and without
payoﬀ externalities. For the base treatment without payoﬀ externalities we found a substantially lower
percentage of subjects who behaved according to theory as compared to earlier results in the literature.
We explained this deviation through a combination of the experimental setting (internet vs. lab), the
probability combination (asymmetric prior vs. symmetric prior), the number of subjects deciding in
sequence (20 vs. 6), and the level of payoﬀs. While our results do not question the fact that information
cascades do happen in experiments, they certainly show that cascades ￿ depending on the setting ￿ may
be rarer and shorter than predicted by theory and suggested by earlier experiments.
Surprisingly, there is only a very small literature on the interplay between information cascades and
payoﬀ externalities, either theoretical (see e.g. Choi, 1997; Frisell, 2003) or experimental (e.g. Hung and
Plott, 2001). We studied several diﬀerent forms of payoﬀ externalities, positive and negative ones and
those that apply to all group members or only to predecessors or followers. The experimental results
are by and large compatible with the theoretical predictions. With positive externalities (network
eﬀects) cascades become longer and more robust, whereas with negative externalities they become short
and fragile. In most cases we could not reject the hypothesis that subjects behaved myopically as
treatments that have the same theoretical solution under myopia yield very similar results. The form
of payoﬀ externality was found to have strong eﬀects also on the predictability of the majority decision.
With strong network eﬀects, already after the second player (of 20) the majority decision can reliably
be predicted.
17Finally, this experiment was designed to test reputation eﬀects in the framework of a cascade model.
Reputation of a player was presented as the cumulative payoﬀ the player earned in previous and un-
related rounds. Subjects could observe these payoﬀs, and we found strong support for the hypothesis
that the decision of the player with the highest reputation signi￿cantly in￿uences the choice behavior
of later subjects.
18References
Alevy, E. Jonathan, Michael S. Haigh, and A. John List, ￿Information Cascades: Evidence
from a Field Experiment with Market Professionals,￿ mimeo: University of Maryland, 2003.
Anderhub, V., R. M￿ller, and C. Schmidt,￿ D e s i g na n dE v a l u a t i o no fa nE c o n o m i cE x p e r i m e n t
Via the Internet,￿ Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization,2 0 0 1, 46(2), 227￿47.
Anderson, L. R.,￿ P a y o ﬀ Eﬀects in Information Cascade Experiments,￿ Economic Inquiry,2 0 0 1,
39(4), 609￿15.
Banerjee, A. V., ￿A Simple Model of Herd Behavior,￿ Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1992, 107(3),
797￿817.
Bikhchandani, S., D. Hirshleifer, and I. Welch, ￿A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural
Change as Informational Cascades,￿ Journal of Political Economy, 1992, 100(5), 992￿1026.
Bosch-Domenech, A., J. Montalvo, R. Nagel, and A. Satorra,￿ O n e ,T w o ,( T h r e e ) ,I n ￿nity,
...: Newspaper and Lab Beauty-Contest Experiments,￿ American Economic Review, 2002, 92(5),
1687￿1701.
Charness, G., E. Haruvy, and D. Sonsino, ￿Social Distance and Reciprocity: The Internet Vs.
The Laboratory,￿ mimeo,2 0 0 1.
Choi, Jay Pil, ￿Herd Behavior, the "Pinguin Eﬀect", and the Suppression of Informational Diﬀu-
sion: An Analysis of Informational Externalities and Payoﬀ Interdependency,￿ RAND Journal of
Economics, 1997, 28(3), 407￿425.
Cipriani, Marco and Antonio Guarino, ￿Herd Behavior in a Laboratory Financial Market,￿ mimeo,
University College London, 2004.
Diamond, D. and P. Dybvig, ￿Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance and Liquidity,￿ Journal of Political
Economy, 1983, 91(3),4 0 1￿19.
Drehmann, Mathias, J￿rg Oechssler, and Andreas Roider, ￿Herding and Contrarian Behavior
in Financial Markets - An Internet Experiment,￿ mimeo, University of Bonn, 2004.
F o r s y t h e ,R . ,F .N e l s o n ,G .N e u m a n n ,a n dJ .W r i g h t , ￿Anatomy of an Experimental Political
Stock Market,￿ American Economic Review, 1992, 82, 1142￿1161.
,T .R i e t z ,a n dT .R o s s , ￿Wishes, Expectations and Actions: A Survey on Price Formation in
Election Stock Markets,￿ Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1999, 39,8 3 ￿ 110.
Frisell, Lars, ￿On the Interplay of Informational Spillovers and Payoﬀ Externalities,￿ RAND Journal
of Economics, 2003, 34(3), 582￿592.
Goeree, Jacob K., Thomas R. Palfrey, Brian W. Rogers, and McKelvey Richard D.,￿ S e l f -
Correcting Information Cascades,￿ mimeo, California Institute of Technology, 2004.
G r e i n e r ,B . ,H .J a c o b s e n ,a n dC .S c h m i d t , ￿The Virtual Laboratory Infrastructure for Online
Economic Experiments,￿ mimeo, 2002.
G￿th, W., C. Schmidt, and M. Sutter, ￿Fairness in the Mail and Opportunism on the Internet
- a Newspaper Experiment on Ultimatum Bargaining,￿ German Economic Review, forthcoming,
2003.
19Holt, Charles, ￿Webgames and Strategy: Recipes for Interactive Learning,￿ mimeo, 2002.
H u n g ,A .A .a n dC .R .P l o t t , ￿Information Cascades: Replication and an Extension to Majority
Rule and Conformity Rewarding Institutions,￿ American Economic Review,2 0 0 1, 91(5), 1508￿20.
K￿bler, D. and G. Weizs￿cker, ￿Limited Depth of Reasoning and Failure of Cascade Formation in
the Laboratory,￿ Review of Economic Studies, 2004, 71(2), 425￿441.
Lucking-Reiley, D., ￿Using Field Experiments to Test Equivalence Between Auction Formats: Magic
on the Internet,￿ American Economic Review, 1999, 89(5), 1063￿1080.
Oberhammer, C. and A. Stiehler, ￿Does Cascade Behavior in Information Cascades Re￿ect
Bayesian Updating? An Experimental Study,￿ mimeo,2 0 0 1.
Scharfstein, David and Jeremy Stein, ￿Herd Behavior and Investment,￿ American Economic Re-
view, 1990, 80(3), 465￿79.
Shavit, T., D. Sonsino, and U. Benzion, ￿A Comparative Study of Lotteries Evaluation in Class
a n do nt h eW e b , ￿Journal of Economic Psychology,2 0 0 1, 22, 483￿491.
Shy, Oz, The Economics of Network Industries, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Welch, I., ￿Sequential Sales, Learning, and Cascades,￿ Journal of Finance, 1992, 47(2), 695￿732.
Willinger, M. and A. Ziegelmeyer, ￿Are More Informed Agents Able to Shatter Information Cas-
cades in the Lab?,￿ in Cohendet, Llerena, Stahn, and Umbhauer, eds., The Economics of Networks:
Interaction and Behaviours,S p r i n g e r ,1998, pp. 291￿305.
Ziegelmeyer, Anthony, Juergen Bracht, Frederic Koessler, and Eyal Winter, ￿Fragility of
Information Cascades: An Experimental Study Using Elicited Beliefs,￿ mimeo: University of Stras-
bourg, 2002.
20Appendix: Instructions
Once connected to our website www.a-oder-b.de, there was ￿rst a general overview on the experiment
(screen 1 below). Then, subjects where asked to provide some personal information (screen 2 below).
Only if all information was provided, subjects were allowed to continue and learn their player number
as well as the monetary incentives in the current phase of the experiment (screen 3 below). Note that
the number of lottery tickets and the prizes mentioned below relate to Phase I of the experiment.
Subsequently, the actual experiment began. Screen 4 below provides an example of the ￿rst of three
stages (treatment BHW), and we point out how these instructions were altered in case of treatments
BHW+AS and BHW+R. Screen 5 below provides an example of a treatment with payoﬀ externalities
played in the second stage (treatment Early bird). The other treatments with payoﬀ externalities were
explained in a similar fashion. As each stage had the same basic structure, we do not provide an example
of the third stage.
Subjects also had at all times the option of opening a pop￿up window that contained a summary
of the main features of the set￿up. All phrases emphasized in this translation were also emphasized in
the original web page.
Screen 1: Introduction
A game-theoretic experiment Are you a good decision-maker? We challenge you! Professor J.
Oechssler together with the ￿Laboratorium for Experimental Research in Economics￿ at the University
of Bonn aims to test various scienti￿c theories through the online￿experiment ￿A-or-B￿. Financial sup-
port is provided by the consultancy McKinsey & Company.
Attractive prizes By participating in the experiment you support the scienti￿c work of the University
of Bonn. At the same time you participate in a lottery for a total of 5,000 Euros which are distributed
among 5 of the participants. The more thorough your decisions are, the greater your chances of winning.
Of course you will also need some luck. The game takes approximately 15m i n u t e s .
The experiment The experiment consists of three rounds. In every round you￿ll be assigned to a
group and you - as well as every other member of your group - will have to take an investment decision.
Without background knowledge the decision would be pure speculation. However, all players in a group
will receive tips by investment bankers. Each group member gets a tip from a diﬀerent investment
banker. The investment bankers are experienced but can￿t make perfect predictions. The reliability of
the tip is the same for every investment banker. As additional information, each player can observe the
decisions of his predecessors in his group.
For each correct decision you will earn a predetermined amount of Lotto￿Euros. After the third round,
the Lotto￿Euros you earned will be converted into lottery tickets on a one-to-one basis. Hence, the
better your investment decisions, the higher your chances of winning. The experiment ends on June 7,
2002. The winners of the lottery will be noti￿ed after June 16, 2002 via ordinary mail. Now, let￿s begin
the experiment!
Screen 2: Request of personal information
Welcome to the online-experiment ￿A-or-B￿. Please note that you can only play once. Before the
game starts, we would like to ask you for some personal information. Of course, the results of the game
will be kept separately from your personal information and will be analyzed anonymously. The mail
address is only needed to notify the winners. Information on your ￿e l do fs t u d i e s ,a g e ,s e x ,e t c .a r eo n l y
21used for scienti￿c purposes. Detailed information regarding data protection may be found here [Link].
[Data entry ￿elds for last name, ￿rst name, address, email, student status, ￿e l do fs t u d i e s ,y e a ro f
studies, Ph.D. status, age and sex]
Screen 3: Player number and incentives
Thank you for providing the requested information. Your player number is: [player number]. Your
player number, the number of lottery tickets you won, and additional information regarding the exper-
iment will be automatically send to your email address after you have completed the experiment.
In this phase of the experiment, a total of 40,000 lottery tickets will be distributed, and 5 partici-
pants can win 1000 Euros each. Every lottery ticket has the same chance of winning.
Screen 4: Stage 1
You have to make an important investment decision: there are two risky assets (A and B). Only
one asset will be successful and pay out 10 Lotto-Euros (LE). The other asset will yield no pro￿t
at all. The successful asset was determined randomly before the ￿rst player of this group played.
Hence, the same asset is successful for all players in your group. Without additional information you
can rely on the fact that in 55% of cases asset A is successful while in 45% of cases asset B is successful.
Each participant in your group faces the same problem as you do: he has to choose between the
assets and receives a tip from his respective investment banker. The reliability of the tips is the same
for all investment bankers, and the tips of the investment bankers are independent of each other. The
t i po fe a c hi n v e s t m e n tb a n k e ri sc o r r e c ti n60% of the cases,i . e .i n100 cases where asset A (respectively
B) is successful, in 60 cases the investment banker gives the correct tip A (respectively B) while in 40
cases the tip is not correct. The tip of your investment banker is: [B]
While each participant only knows the tip of his own investment banker, you - as every player in
your group - can observe the decisions of the respective predecessors. Which players are assigned to
which group is random and will diﬀer from round to round. You are the [4th] investor in this group.
One after another, your predecessors have made the following decisions:
Investor no. 1 23
Decision B A B What do you choose? [A] or [B].
Was the decision diﬃcult? Independent of your decision, what do you think is the probability of A
being the successful asset? [ ] %.
After the third round you￿ll ￿nd out whether your decision was correct. Let￿s move on the next round.
[ I nc a s eo ft r e a t m e n tBHW+AS, in addition to the decisions also the tips of the predecessors were
displayed, and the third paragraph of Screen 4 was replaced by: ￿You - as every player in your group -
can observe the decisions of the respective predecessors and the tips that they have received from their
respective investment bankers. Which players are assigned to which group is random and will diﬀer
from round to round. You are the [4th] investor in this group. One after another, your predecessors
have made the following decisions and have received the following tips:￿].
[ I nc a s eo ft r e a t m e n tBHW+R, in addition to the decisions also the cumulative payoﬀso ft h ep r e -
22decessors earned in the respective other two stages were displayed, and the third paragraph of Screen
4w a sr e p l a c e db y :￿ W h i l ee a c hp a r t i c i p a n to n l yk n o w st h et i po fh i so w ni n v e s t m e n tb a n k e r ,y o u-
as every player in your group - can observe the decisions of the respective predecessors. In addition,
each participant can observe how many Lotto￿Euros their respective predecessors have earned in their
respective other two stages. Which players are assigned to which group is random and will diﬀer from
round to round. You are the [4th] investor in this group. One after another, your predecessors have
made the following decisions and have earned the following amount of Lotto￿Euros on their respective
two other stages:￿].
Screen 5: Round 2
Another investment decision has to be made. The basic structure remains the same as in round 1.
(In case you want to review the central features of round 1 please click [here].) Again, there are two
risky assets (A and B). Only one asset will be successful and pay out 10 Lotto-Euros (LE). In 55% of
cases it is asset A that is successful. As in the ￿rst round the successful asset was determined randomly
before the ￿rst player of this group played. Hence, it is not necessarily the same asset as in round that
is successful.
As in round 1, every participant receives a tip from his investment banker which is correct in 60%
of all cases. This time, your investment banker recommends: [A]
In contrast to round 1, each participant has to pay 0.4 LE for each of his predecessors in his group
who has selected the same asset as himself - independent of whether his decision to choose A respec-
tively B turns out to be successful, or not.
Consider the following example: suppose you were the ￿fth participant in a group and your prede-
cessors had made the choices BABB. If you also would choose B, you would have to make a payment
of 3￿0.4LE because three of your predecessors have chosen B. If you would choose A, you would have
to pay 1 ￿ 0.4LE.
In order to be able to make these payments you receive an endowment of 11 Lotto-Euro. Once the
above payments have been deducted, you can keep the remainder.
While each participant only knows the tip of his own investment banker, you - as every player in
your group - can observe the decisions of the respective predecessors. You are the [5th] investor in this
group. One after another, your predecessors have made the following decisions:
Investor no. 1 23
Decision B A B What do you choose? [A] or [B].
Was the decision diﬃcult? Independent of your decision, what do you think is the probability of A
being the successful asset? [ ] %.
After the third round you￿ll ￿nd out whether your decision was correct. Let￿s move on the next round.
23